USA v. Kyle Costello by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-12-2018 
USA v. Kyle Costello 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Kyle Costello" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 31. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/31 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-4092 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KYLE COSTELLO, 
    Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 14-107-01) 
District Judge:  Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before:  VANASKIE, RENDELL, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 12, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to 
I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.  
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 Appellant Kyle Costello raises two arguments in this appeal from his conviction 
on armed bank robbery and related charges.  First, he contends that his conviction is 
invalid because his extradition from Texas to Pennsylvania on a state parole violation 
charge was a sham to hold him for federal prosecution at a later date, in violation of his 
rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.  Second, he argues that the District 
Court incorrectly sentenced him as a career offender because his prior state conviction for 
aggravated assault did not constitute a “crime of violence.”  We agree with the District 
Court’s rulings that no Speedy Trial Act violation occurred, and that Costello is a career 
offender for purposes of sentencing.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order.   
I. 
   
On November 7, 2013, video surveillance showed two men committing an armed 
robbery at the National Penn Bank near Shillington, Pennsylvania.  Costello’s parole 
agent saw Costello’s image on the news and identified him as one of the robbers.1  On 
November 21, 2013, the Cumru Township Police Department issued an arrest warrant for 
Costello for the bank robbery.  Costello was arrested in Texas on December 20, 2013.  
On that same date, a parole violation warrant was issued for Costello by the Pennsylvania 
Board of Probation and Parole.  During a removal hearing in Texas, Costello contested 
extradition on the Cumru Township arrest warrant.  To expedite his transfer to 
                                              
1 Costello had been paroled from SCI-Rockview for aggravated assault and 
kidnapping.   
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Pennsylvania, the detainer on the Cumru Township warrant was lifted, and Costello was 
brought back to Pennsylvania pursuant to the state parole violation warrant.     
Upon his arrival in Pennsylvania on January 15, 2014, Costello was incarcerated at 
SCI-Huntingdon on the parole violation warrant.  Fifty days later, on March 6, 2014, a 
federal grand jury returned an indictment against Costello for the robbery of the National 
Penn Bank.2  Specifically, he was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, armed bank robbery and aiding and abetting, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(d), and carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a 
crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).     
Costello moved to dismiss the federal indictment, arguing that, because more than 
thirty days had elapsed between his initial arrest on January 15, 2014 and the return of the 
federal indictment on March 6, 2014, his rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated.  
After conducting a hearing, the District Court denied Costello’s motion, holding that he 
had failed to show the requisite “collusion” between federal and state agents that would 
trigger the Speedy Trial Act upon his detention at SCI-Huntingdon.  The District Court 
explained that Costello’s showing of “mere cooperation or close contact between the 
federal government and the state” was not enough.  (App. at 13.)   
Costello proceeded to trial, was convicted on all charges, and the matter proceeded 
to sentencing.  Over Costello’s objection, the District Court found that Costello’s 2004 
and 2008 state convictions for aggravated assault properly served as “crimes of violence” 
                                              
2 State charges were dropped as a result of the federal indictment.   
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predicates for a career offender designation under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, thereby exposing Costello to a Guidelines imprisonment range of 360 months 
to life.  The District Court then exercised its discretion to vary downward from the 
Guidelines range and imposed an aggregate prison term of 264 months.  Costello timely 
appealed.   
II. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  “We review the District 
Court’s conclusions of fact for clear error[,]” and our review of the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act is plenary.  United States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d 464, 
467 (3d Cir. 2003).  “Whether a prior conviction constitutes a crime of violence for 
purposes of the career offender Guideline is a question of law over which we exercise 
plenary review.”  United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 2014).   
A. 
Under the Speedy Trial Act, “[a]ny information or indictment charging an 
individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the 
date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with 
such charges.”  18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).  If the government fails to file the information or 
indictment within thirty days, “such charge against that individual contained in such 
complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped.”  Id. at § 3162(a)(1); see also United 
States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In general, delay is measured from 
the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier, until the start of trial.”).  Where, as 
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here, the defendant is arrested on state charges and later indicted on federal charges, “the 
right to a speedy trial in the federal case is triggered by the federal indictment, and the 
time period under consideration commences on that date.”  Id. at 679.  As stated in 
United States v. Garner, 32 F.3d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir. 1994), an “arrest on state charges 
does not engage the speedy trial protection for a subsequent federal charge.”  See also 
United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1024 (10th Cir. 1993) (“When [the defendant] was 
arrested by state authorities . . .[,] his speedy trial rights for the subsequent federal 
charges did not attach.”).  This is true even if the federal charge shares the same facts as 
the state case.  See United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1992).       
A state arrest, however, may trigger the Speedy Trial Act “when the Government 
has knowledge that an individual is held by state authorities solely to answer to federal 
charges.”  United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 2005).  This is known as 
the “ruse” exception.  See United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1994).  
Under this exception, state proceedings may trigger the Speedy Trial Act upon a showing 
of “collusion or evidence that the detention was for the sole or primary purpose of 
preparing for [federal] criminal prosecution.”  United States v. Garcia-Martinez, 254 
F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2001).   
Costello relies upon the “ruse” exception to argue that the Speedy Trial Act clock 
began running upon his return to Pennsylvania on January 15, 2014.  He thus argues that 
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his indictment by a federal grand jury on March 6, 2014, more than thirty days after his 
incarceration in Pennsylvania began, was invalid as untimely.3 
We have yet to adopt the “ruse” exception.  See Dyer, 325 F.3d at 468 (“Even if 
we were to conclude that the [ruse] exception is a valid one, [the defendant] has not 
shown that he would be entitled to invoke it under the circumstances of this case.”).  We 
again need not decide whether there exists a “ruse” exception to the general rule that the 
Speed Trial Act clock begins to run upon return of the federal indictment, because there 
simply is no evidence of collusion between federal and state law enforcement officials in 
this case, or that Costello was detained on the parole violation warrant for the purpose of 
preparing a federal prosecution.  As the District Court explained following the 
evidentiary hearing on Costello’s motion, “[i]f anything, the testimony showed confusion 
and lack of communication between the state and federal government—the antithesis of 
collusion.”  (App. at 14.)  Indeed, the Assistant District Attorney handling the state 
charges testified that he did not even learn of Costello’s return to Pennsylvania until 
February 24, 2014, and even then continued to build the Commonwealth’s case against 
Costello because he was not sure that the federal government would bring charges.4  
                                              
3 We disagree with the government that Costello waived his “ruse” argument by 
stating during the District Court proceedings that “the defense isn’t in a position to argue 
that there was collusion” based upon the testimony presented.  (App. at 65.)  Costello 
asserted in the District Court, and reasserts here, that the Speedy Trial Act is implicated 
where the “primary purpose” of incarceration by state authorities is to prepare for a 
federal prosecution.  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1; citing Dyer, 325 F.3d at 468.)  We thus 
find that Costello properly preserved his Speedy Trial Act argument.   
 
4 A state docket sheet showed a preliminary hearing scheduled in Costello’s case 
for March 10, 2014.  
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Simply being incarcerated in a state prison before federal indictment does not mean that 
agents brought Costello back solely, or even primarily, for federal prosecution.  Thus, 
even if we were to find that the “ruse” exception exists, we hold that Costello’s Speedy 
Trial Act rights were not triggered upon his arrival at SCI-Huntingdon on January 15, 
2014.    
B. 
 The career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines imposes enhanced 
sentences for defendants who have “two prior felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  Pertinent to the matter 
under consideration, “crime of violence” is defined as: 
any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, that— 
 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another . . . . 
  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). 
Costello was convicted in 2004 of violating 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(3), which 
provides that “[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: . . . attempts to cause or 
intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any of the [specifically enumerated] 
officers, agents, [or] employees . . . in the performance of duty . . . .”5  “Bodily injury” is 
defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
2301.  Costello argues that his 2004 aggravated assault conviction can qualify as a “crime 
                                              
5 Costello does not appear to challenge the District Court’s classification of his 
2008 aggravated assault conviction as a “crime of violence.”  
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of violence” only if the use of “violent force” is a necessary element of § 2702(a)(3).  In 
support of this assertion, he relies upon Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), 
which held that the term “violent felony,” as used in the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), requires use of “violent force—that is, force capable of 
causing physical pain or injury to another person.”  Id. at 140 (emphasis in original).  
Costello argues that § 2702(a)(3) does not require use of “violent force” because 
“impairment of physical condition” qualifies as the requisite “bodily injury,” and a 
person’s physical condition may be “worsened, lessened, or diminished—i.e., impaired—
without the person necessarily suffering ‘physical pain or injury’ through the 
employment of ‘violent force.’”  (Appellant’s Br. at 19-20).   
We disagree.  Section 2702(a)(3) requires that the accused knowingly or 
intentionally cause “bodily injury.”  The statute therefore necessarily contemplates the 
use of such physical force as to impair one’s physical condition or produce “substantial 
pain.”  “Johnson held that so long as the force involved is ‘capable of causing physical 
pain or injury to another person,’ . . . the ‘physical force’ requirement of the crime-of-
violence definition is satisfied.”  De Leon Castellanos v. Holder, 652 F.3d 762, 766 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (quoting Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140).  Costello cites no authority to support his 
assertion that a person can intentionally impair another’s physical condition without use 
of such physical force as is “capable of causing pain or injury.”  Johnson, 559 U.S. at 
140.  Common sense dictates that knowingly or intentionally causing impairment of 
another’s physical condition requires the use of physical force.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the District Court did not err in finding that Costello’s aggravated assault conviction 
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under § 2702(a)(3) constituted a “crime of violence” as that term is defined in the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines.    
IV.  
 For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court entered on 
November 1, 2016.    
